Coronavirus (COVID-19) A unique response – Why?

[This is a draft]

Coronavirus analysis:

The world response makes no sense – it’s unique in the last 150 years of human history.

Why would countries cripple their economies and shut down their populations?

Only one reason seems plausible … there’s something more serious about this ‘RNA virus’ that we are not being told (see the section on virus mutation and amplification below).

Normally a ‘novel virus’ takes weeks or so before the specialists have a handle on it, and maybe a few months before response comes into play. Whereas China had locked down three cities, each bigger than London, in weeks.

Now, Wuhan is where China has two of it’s bio warfare centres ( see attached article ). So, if they knew what had escaped and what it could do then that might explain the sharp and firm response?

On masks. Don’t waste your time. Without proper training in use, handling (when eating), disposal and frequency of changing them (daily) they just become a vector for transmission. Apparently, enterprising folk are rescuing used ones, ironing them and selling them as new!

On risks. My view is that time will show that smartphones / tablets were an important factor in transmission. Watch people in public, phone in one hand, itchy nose wiped on the other hand and then used to touch the screen. Then people say ‘Come and look at this’ (huddle together), ‘let me zoom in’ (touching other person’s phone) – guess what, virus spreads.

On likely deaths. Current CFR (Casualty Fatality Rate) published by WHO (World Health Organisation in their Situation Reports) indicates between 1 in 20 and 1 in 5 of over 65’s will die. Across all age groups in the world that’s up to 200 million (worse than so-called ‘Spanish ‘flu’ after the First World War). I assume that is why governments are implementing these measures. However, the data are incomplete at present. Many people will get coronavirus and never know they have had it, so not on the stats. We’ll see.

On sources: It’s been called an information pandemic – disinformation spreading faster than the virus!

Part of that is to do with people being ‘fed’ unreliable information via their (personally customised) social media accountsThey get ‘pushed’ skewed information and ‘click-bait’ based on their Likes. Alexa one of the worst.

I have been shocked how passive people are being content to be mere receivers of what’s trending.

Few people seem know how to seek out unbiased information, eg by manually putting in URLs to reliable sources such as:

Instead, they type something into a search and take whatever it puts up. I heard recently of someone who had been scammed financially because they thought that the financial package at the top of Google’s search must be the best – otherwise why would Google have put it at the top! I’ve heard others say ‘But Google IS the Internet, isn’t it?’

Virus Mutation, Amplification and New Variants

[This section is still in draft]

1. Mutation. Virus breed by hijacking the mechanisms within affected cells to make copies of themselves *within one species of host*. Eventually the cell dies, bursts and the virus spread, eventually leaving the host body. But virus have only RNA which does not have ‘error correction’ (which the double helix of our DNA does have). Hence it is common for virus to mutate. Analysis of these different variants of same virus generates a ‘family tree’ – once you have a vaccine for the grandmother virus, all the descendants can therefore, usually, be treated (Los Alamos has done a lot of work on this down the years, open source).

2. Amplification. This is where the virus is breeding in a species whose replication mechanism enables the virus to turn into a new type which is able to jump species (as happened in this case, maybe from bats as food in China). This is Amplification (-ish), the bats amplified the virus’ ability to spread beyond the species it was in before. Now, if amplification happens in humans the new-new type may also infect humans, but with different symptoms from the current coronavirus. For the epidemiologists this would be, in effect, an entirely new outbreak.

3. Host self-induced infection (not the correct phrase). This is the scariest and is what Greg Bear’s ‘Darwin’s Radio’ is mostly about. OK. Sorry, getting a bit long … I’ll break it up:

– In our DNA we have what used to be called ‘junk DNA’. It is becoming apparent that it is anything but junk. A lot of it codes for virus / bacteria (and other things, beyond this scope) that mammals / humans suffered from in the past but which eventually became part of our biology (eg friendly gut bacteria – in the same way that the mitochondria energy generators in our cells were once free-swimming but are now symbiotic with our cells). The archaic virus are called ERV (endogenous retro-virus), the human ones are HERV (human-ERV).

– OK, so what? Well, it has been shown that when the wider human context changes in some fundamental way signals are sent which trigger the HERV to express. They go from junk DNA into active virus / bacteria (what the exact triggers are is not yet known, but triggers cause the DNA to ‘dance’, a writhing which brings unusual parts of the DNA close together). Potentially, activating an archaic HERV could be as bad as bringing back the dinosaurs (no natural predators etc).

– So! Maybe the BioWarfare lab in Wuhan was working on a virus which would deliberately trigger HERVs? (Wuhan is China’s main lab – according to one of the Chinese doctors who blew the whistle early on and died in Jan).

If so, then we are in trouble … it would explain the following.

SUPPLEMENTARY Re China ‘Protesteth too much’

It all just doesn’t add up …

Why would China’s **immediate first action** be to lock down two cities of 10 million plus people?
Historically, new outbreaks don’t happen like that – it takes time to work out what is happening and why, **then** the action comes in – not first.

Conclusion, surely, is that somebody knew something up front … (apparently Xi Jinping knew in Nov 2019)

Is that why WHO and others (seem to be) so alarmed about this one. Measures now in place are the same, if not more stringent, than those for Ebola or Anthrax. Is this going to be as deadly as Ebola (CFR of about 50%)?

Current CFR (Case Fatality Ration in %, proportion of cases that die) data suggests not …

BUT, Italy / Iran has just notified of cases which have died – with a CFR of over 10% -which would be very alarming.

For info: the post WWI Spanish ‘flu had a CFR of about 3%, and millions died – mind you, a third of the European population was infected.


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Populism ‘Fake News’, ‘Alternative Facts’ and Democracy

In early 2016 we predicted that the Leave voters would win the UK’s EU Referendum (BREXIT). Incidentally, we also predicted that Donald Trump would win. How did we know? Because we could see that social media realised the democracy of the ‘mob’ that the Greeks feared – where the ill-informed majority could be easily influenced.

As Jose Ortega y Gasset said in his visionary 1930s book ‘The Revolt of the Masses’:

The characteristic of the hour is that the commonplace mind, despite (maybe) knowing itself to be commonplace, has the assurance to proclaim the rights of the commonplace and to impose them wherever it will” …

What does this mean? As Thomas Jefferson said “The greatest threat to democracy is an uneducated citizenry“. Donald Trump, in his victory speech in February 2016, preened and affectionately recounted the numbers that added up to his huge victory:

We won the evangelicals. We won with young. We won with old. We won with highly educated. We won with poorly educated. I love the poorly educated.”, he said.

For Trump, the Fake News and Alternative Facts spread by social media were his key cards. Of course he loves the poorly educated, they don’t trust experts or academics or professionals in authority because some of those people have been found cheating or misleading the public at some time. Instead, they trust their online friends more.

The conclusion in the mind of the populus seems to be, via confirmation bias, that therefore all these people are liars. Social media accelerates this bias in ways that society in general does not understand (there are a few that warn about the risks but they are treated as Cassandras, or as ‘cyberoutlaws who dare to be different‘).

This is the new democracy at work – through social-media – where one ill-informed person’s vote is as good as any other and millions can say ‘”If this many of us think X, then X must be right – ours is an Alternative Fact! Anyone who disagrees with us can’t be trusted … they are telling us Fake News.”.

Some people might say that, in the UK in 2016, “The commonplace mind did not, and probably still does not, understand how the EU works, yet affirmed its misunderstanding of things in the BREXIT vote, and has imposed it on all.”

In the longer-term, the trend seems to be towards assuming that the mass view must be correct. Why? Because it’s a majority view and ‘That’s democracy, right?’. This may undermine humanity’s ability to take decisive, often unpopular decisions, in the face of existential challenges. Correction … it will undermine our ability.


Posted in Change, Influence, Learning, Possibilities, Prediction, Probability, Reflection, Relationships, Social Media, Unintended consequences | Leave a comment

Why are ‘unintended consequences’ almost inevitable?

We so often hear politicians, managers and those in positions of authority wailing about the ‘unintended consequences’ of their actions – or worse, excusing damaging outcomes with a shrug of the shoulders and saying “But they were unintended consequences …” as if that lets them ‘off the hook’ of their responsibilities.

But were these consequences in the real world really unintended? Maybe they were actually inevitable, even ‘normal’ given the actions taken. Could it be that if appropriate approaches and mindsets had been employed then the damaging consequences could have been avoided?

To which the answer is and emphatic “Yes!”.

If one is bringing about change in the real world, in the complex and largely unpredictable inter-connected world in which we live then it is no good merely following the ‘best practice’ taught on business administration courses. The real world cannot be treated as if it is a supermarket chain.

Instead, complexity thinking offers a clear set of principles that should be followed when intervening in wider policy, commercial, social, community, medical and environmental matters.

Avoiding those unintended consequences

I am sure you are now thinking “OK, if we can’t predict how can we see what the consequences will be?”. Good point! The answer is that, yes, we can’t predict specific instances ( x will happen in this place at 1256 on the 27th March to Fred Bloggs and Xioa Lui), but we can anticipate the future if we are forward-looking.

Indeed, complexity thinking can identify that certain classes of outcome are likely, even inevitable, if we go about a particular task in a certain way – or if we organise ourselves inappropriately.

[The rest of this post will give examples]

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Applying Complexity Thinking to the Real World


The eleven ‘Principles of Practice’ below have been derived from the experiences of practitioners (people who are responsible for bringing about real-world change) which are discussed in a companion book “Complexity Demystified – a Guide for Practitioners” (downloadable as a PDF from here).

An example of how these principles can be used is shown by the ‘Liveable Cities‘ project which, in 2017, published a series of short booklets illustrating complexity thinking at work.

The principles below indicate that, in practice, integrative and iterative approaches are essential to bring about desired changes – and so doing minimises ‘unintended consequences‘:

• Principle 1: Dynamic, ongoing change can be influenced purposefully. This is because: a) the underlying ‘drivers of complexity’ have been identified, and b) practical techniques are available to purposefully engage with and shape the underlying drivers.

• Principle 2: Context understanding and perceptions are diverse – there is no ‘single view of the truth’. The experienced complexities of stakeholders are necessarily different, as are their knowledge and information needs.

• Principle 3: Change is ongoing, dynamic and multi-level – there may be no end. This means that trends, flows, gradients, potentials and other ‘energy metrics’ are appropriate dynamic indicators of the progress of practice.

• Principle 4: There are many qualities of power and influence to accommodate. These affect people’s ability to adapt and may arise from individuals, their beliefs and vulnerabilities, or from community values, from gender issues, institutional structures and the political economy, and from the changing environment and so on.

• Principle 5: It is necessary to appreciate who is / what are best placed to bring about change. Given the inevitable natural complexity of practice, those tasked with achieving change may not be the ones best placed in a situation to be drivers of change. Given the time horizons, practitioners should work adaptively through those who are best placed.

• Principle 6: Interventions must have the necessary requisite variety, i.e. have appropriate complexity-worthiness given the desired changes. This insight arises from Ashby’s ‘Law of Requisite Variety’ (1957) which states, in essence, that to influence something your practical behaviours must be equivalent to, and preferably exceed, the repertoire of behaviours of that which you are trying to influence – i.e. to deal with innovation by innovating.

• Principle 7: Practice is not just about adapting, but is also about being able to adapt the adapting and learn. This is because people are in continual co-evolution with the environment and, as there will never be a ‘steady-state’ balance or equilibrium, anticipatory innovation will always be required. One cannot adapt once and then stop.

• Principle 8: Different decision-making and problem-solving styles are required for different situations. Because practice involves inevitable novelty and change over time, there can never be a ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution, nor can ‘optimized’ processes be used as ‘best practice’ in all situations. Indeed, many modelling tools are just not fit for purpose in the face of real-world complexity.

• Principle 9: When reasoning about change, past evidence does not guarantee future prediction. This means that, though we may have evidence of a past train of events, there is no guarantee that we can extrapolate a reliable prediction from this into the future. As there are limits to what we can know and observe, there will always be uncertainties and unknowns, and that we must accept this as a given. A key skill for practice and risk management is envisioning, and being prepared to act on possible, not probable, futures.

• Principle 10: When innovating, transition to new forms may be the only valid option. Because of the inevitable novelty already mentioned, the transformation from non-adaptive capabilities to being appropriately complexity-worthy will require purposeful, ongoing, innovation and adaptation. Gradual, superficial, incremental transition is just not an option in some unsettling circumstances.

• Principle 11: Change will be impeded unless appropriate degrees of freedom and ‘wiggle room’ are available. Being open to change means appreciating where the ‘spaces of possibilities’ are, and how to maximize and exploit them. A misplaced drive for control, repeatability and certainty may clamp down on the very space that is needed for adaptive behaviour to flourish.

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Posted in Adaptation, Agility, Appropriateness, Change, Complexity Demystified, Complexity-worthiness, Contextual complexity, Experienced complexity, Influence, Liveable cities, Natural complexity, Opportunities, Possibilities, Practice, Prediction, Purposeful, Reflection, Transformation, Transition, Unintended consequences | Leave a comment

ISIS Ascendant – Because the West gave up its Winning Strategy in 2001?

A Winning Strategy Lost?

The UK’s ‘Bin Laden Dossier‘ of 2001 reports that Bin Laden’s motivation was to wage jihad against countries (such as the USA and UK) engaging in ‘un-Islamic behaviour’.

In his speeches, Bin Laden cited examples of this, such as: the westernised mode of dress of young people; their liking of pop music and consumer goods; and their lack of respect for their elders and leaders for example.
In other words, the West was (unwittingly) already winning a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign though the spread of consumer capitalism and western goods, media, film, entertainments and comfortable lifestyle.

After 9/11, it could be reasoned that the West’s best course of action was to continue, and intensify, these so-called ‘soft power’ activities – not to attack anyone with hard power.

But this is not what happened and the War on Terror (always unwinable by definition) went ahead. The situation in 2015 continues to ramp up conflict, into what now seems inevitable – World War Three (WWIII).

World War Three (WWIII) – The War of Ideologies

Conflict in the Middle East is not new. It goes back at least as far as Egyptian times (Ostler 2006).  And then, with Islam, it had the Shia / Sunni schism at its root. From the time of The Crusaders onwards, so-called Western forces and governments have had little success in changing outcomes (Stewart 2006,  Tanner 2002, Wallach 2005).

Recent experiences in the region (Iraq, Afghanistan – even for the Russians) are not encouraging for the coalition that the UK and US governments are hoping to put together in 2016.

Also, analysis of the capabilities of Western coalitions (Lwin 1997, Mackay and Tatham 2011, Smith 2005, Treverton 2003) show up a series of endemic weaknesses in mindset, approach, capabilities and strategy and tactics.

With these in mind it is worth while trying to analyse what possible futures we may face. With certainty an impossibility, a sound approach is to develop a range of hypotheses (as in this example high-level scenario involving tactical nuclear weapons) and, using judgement (not just computer modelling), evaluate their relative merits.

Of prime importance is being realistic about what can and can’t be achieved practically. Especially in a situation where hundreds of factions vie for power, where allegiences are endlessly changing and loyalty cannot be relied upon. At the heart of WWIII is a clash of unreconcilable ideologies which, as the Cold War showed, may take generations to resolve. Negotiation (Howard 1999) is not an option – yet.

Till then, as Lawrence noted following his experiences of the ‘Arab Revolt’ of 1916-18 – and of the subsequent negotiations (including the betrayal of the Sykes-Picot agreement, which still rankles in the Middle East today) – nothing and no one can be trusted and nothing can be relied upon.

In 2016, little has changed from his time. Money, mercenaries and mediocrity mean that the chances of ‘success’ for the West’s new coalition are slim. And in a situation where it is not even possible to say unequivocally what constitutes ‘winning’, then we are all in for a long haul.

What has changed is that this time the consequences are global – and fanaticism,  ruthless death and suicide are ISIS’ most potent weapons of coercion. No one is ‘safe’ and, currently, every possibility may happen.

We live in interesting times.


– Lwin, M. R. (1997) ‘General Tzu’s Army: OPFOR of the Future’. JFQ, USA.
– Howard, N. (1999) ‘Confrontation Analysis: How to Win Operations Other than War. CCRP, DoD.
– Lawrence, T. E. (1922) ‘Seven Pillars of Wisdom’. Various editions.
– Mackay, A. Tatham, S. (2011) ‘Behavioural Conflict: Why understanding people and their motivations will prove decisive in future conflict’. Military Studies Press. Saffron Walden, UK.
– Ostler, N. (2006) ‘Empires of the Word: A Language History of the World’. Harper Collins.
– Smith, R. (2005) ‘The Utility of Force’, p323-331. Published by Allen Lane, London.
– Stewart, R. (2006) Occupational Hazards, pp360-361. Picador, London.
– Tanner, S. (2002) ‘Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the war against the Taliban.
– Treverton, G.F. (2003) ‘Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information’. Cambridge University Press. New York.
– Wallach, J. (2005) ‘Desert Queen. The Extraordinary Life of Gertrude Bell: Adventurer, Adviser to Kings, Ally of Lawrence of Arabia’. Phoenix, London.

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War on Terror – always unwinnable?

The so-called ‘War on Terror‘ has a rather silly name – as daft as a ‘war on democracy’ or a ‘war on happiness’.

Terrorism has been part of the human condition for millenia. As history shows, one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter (think of Israel, South Africa and Northern Ireland for example). One cannot destroy it, any more than you can destroy the human emotions.

So ‘terror’ can never be eradicated. There will always be those who dissent, feel oppressed or disenfranchised (often with good cause). Indeed, complexity science would say that dissent is a necessary condition for the stability of society – in that otherwise society would be totalitarian.

As our post on types of organisational form and the work by Michael Thompson on ‘organising and disorganising’ indicates, diversity in human society (and in nature in general) is very complicated and the differences of viewpoint and motivation are the source of the rich interactions seen in the world (at over fifty-eight levels from micro to macro and from instant to eons).

A trite, soundbite ‘war on terror’ is not, and was never, going to change that – something much deeper was required.

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Prediction in the face of Deep Uncertainty

So what about prediction? What is the difference between a backward-looking approaches to decision-making and an anticipatory forward-looking ones (discussed here)? It’s partly about the difference between probability (and risk) and possibility (and deep uncertainty) and partly about people’s assumptions about what causes the future to come about. And it’s not just about the ability to model either – there are limits to that.

And, anyway, why is prediction such a challenge? I think it was Dan Quayle who is supposed to have said “The trouble with the future is that you don’t know what is going to happen!”. He’s so right …

It’s easy to assume that if we know the past, we can predict the future. But the natures of the past and of the future are not the same. The past is like a puzzle, things happen and provide facts which are like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. If some are missing, we probably know they are the red ones with wiggly edges and we can go and look for them. What we have candidate pieces we can apply a matching algorithm against the known need. When the right piece comes up we have the solution. Certainty and predictability seem self-evident, but are they?

The diagram below illustrates this. If we have evidence (green circle) it implies an event and the presence of other evidence waiting to be discovered. Our assumptions can be based on what we know or might know. But the limits on prediction are set by the ‘Prediction Horizon’. With puzzling, we can only predict a short way ahead about, for example,  people’s intentions (shown by the top of the curve, probably only seconds); but we can predict quite a long way ahead about geographical matters (the lower part of the curve). Why is that?Past-Analysis-not-Future-Prediction-01Well. when we try to look into the future we are actually considering, not puzzles, but mysteries. A mystery is ill-formed, it has no pieces, there is no right answer or final outcome and we cannot be sure we have solved it – this is the essence of deep uncertainty. What we can do is form hypotheses about possible futures and seek indicators that support or refute the various possibilities. By ‘competing’ the hypotheses we can anticipate futures and put in place adaptive contingencies. Succesful outcomes are, therefore, practical and feasible. Look at the next chart.

Past-Analysis-not-Future-Prediction-02Some of the possible futures take us beyond the prediction horizon because we are not relying on past evidence – instead we are using our imaginations to ‘think the unthinkable’ – to think not what is probable, but what is possible. The trick, as the third chart shows, is the way that you analyse possibilities and compete the hypotheses. This requires leadership, professionalism, intellect, imagination and courage to buck the trends – and people are doing it effectively and succeeding where others struggle.

Past-Analysis-not-Future-Prediction-03But I’m not going to give those secrets away here!

References: The discussion of puzzles and mysteries has been adapted from Treverton, Gregory F. “Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information“. Cambridge University Press (2003).


Posted in Agent-based modelling, Change, Contextual complexity, Experienced complexity, Possibilities, Prediction, Transformation | Leave a comment

Limits to modelling – Godel’s Incompleteness theorem

Agent-based modelling is often hailed as a way of modelling the future, predicting outcomes in social situations. But there are both hard limitations on what you can predict with modelling, and a lack of understanding of those limitations.This post examines those limitations and shows which models are appropriate for which tasks,

But first, the baselines. As Professor Michael Batty said in 2009 …


Posted in Academic complexity, Adaptation, Agent-based modelling, Appropriateness, Complexity-worthiness, Godel's Incompleteness Theorem, Modelling, Prediction, Probability, Risk, Transformation, Transition | Leave a comment

Possibility, Risk Asessments and dealing with Possible Futures

There is a fundamental flaw in most risk assessments – they are based on past data. That means that they are useless in the face of crises or deep uncertainty, in ambiguous situation or when faced with so-called ‘zero-day’ events.


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Transitioning to Adaptive, Forward-looking Ways-of-Working

In previous posts we talked about the different Aspects of adaptation and what this means for the learning that organisations, communities or individuals might have to do. What follows from this is an obvious question – how do you go about transitioning to the more adaptive and forward-looking ways-of-working needed to harness dynamic change?

The first thing to note is that there are a number of different characteristics of adaptation – these are shown on the chart below and are matched to the Adaptation Aspects previously discussed. In each cell of the matrix is a pen-picture summarising the ways-of-working that apply. Note that the first two columns concern backward-looking behaviours and the last two columns characterise the kind of forward-looking behaviours needed to be adaptive in the face of change (especially given unexpected and unpredictable change).


So, if you want to transition from backward-looking to forward-looking ways of working can that be done in one go? Possibly. We like to use the steam engines to iPods analogy. The technology that was used to make steam engines and bicycles can’t be used to make iPods and enable Facebook social networking. The possibilities offered by steam engines and bicycles are completely different from those available with iPods and Facebook and can only be achieved by transformation. More importantly for practice, steam engineers (in a Facebook world) would have no way of understanding what was going on in a modern context.

Indeed, the consequence of this for practice goes further than just individual capabilities. If you specify and evaluate projects and people in steam-engineering terms, you are only going to get more steam engineers and steam engines – transformation will be impossible in this case. Also, even when people are open to change they still want step-by-step certainty, but often there is no ‘fully connected graph’ between here and there – there has to be a ‘jump’ via some other modality / dimension (eg, via the development of software in the iPods example above). That, IMHO, is what true adaptation is about – having the agility (see below) to make the jump.

So what are the options for the ways in which one might transition / transform? The chart below shows four basic options.

a range of adaptive-transitions

You can of course take Option A and do nothing – that might be appropriate to your context if it is stable and predictable. Or, in an organisation which is risk-averse, people might take Option B and just ‘tinker round the edges’ – but that will keep things within the current organisational behaviours.

To really start adapting Option C is needed. Here people are literally ‘pushing the boundaries’ and changing the organisational principles (eg, permissions, authorities, incentives and so on – see p117 of Complexity Demystified for more on this).

But sometimes, as in the steam-engines to iPods example, things just have to transform and Option D must be taken – really ‘thinking outside the box’. You might be able to make a proof-of-concept transition first which is then an enabler for the full transformation. What might this involve? What are the factors, tensions and modifiers that might need to be traded off? There is a full list from p145 onwards of the Complexity Demystified book.

Go on – make the jump – be different by choice!

By the way – concerning agility, here are a set of characteristics which together lead to overall ‘Agility‘ (the ability to sustain appropriate change – purposefully and dynamically in relation to some context – over time). They are all ‘inter-twingled’ enablers of each other and the adaptation we have been discussing here is just one of them:

  1. Resilience: the ability to recover from or adjust to misfortune, damage, or a destabilising perturbations in the environment;
  2. Robustness: the ability to maintain effectiveness across a range of tasks, situations, and conditions;
  3. Responsiveness: the ability to react to a change in the environment in a timely manner (ie, in a relevant timescale, not just quickly);
  4. Flexibility: the ability to employ multiple ways to succeed and having the capacity to move seamlessly between them;
  5. Innovation: the ability to consider possible futures, do new things and the ability to do old things in new ways; and
  6. Adaptation: the ability to change ways-of-working; the ability to change the ‘organisation’ / community; ability to change necessary capabilities and the ability to ‘morph’ as needed.

Actually, in the real world, as they are all inter-twingled it makes no sense to try to analytically separate them out into distinct categories in practice.

(c) 2012 The abaci Partnership LLP.

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